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 In line with Wittgenstein's axiom that "what the solipsist means is quite correct; 
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest," this thesis aims to demonstrate how the 
gulf between analytic and continental philosophy can best be bridged through the 
mediation of art.  The present thesis brings attention to Markson's work, lauded in the 
tradition of Faulkner, Joyce, and Lowry, as exemplary of the shift from modernity to 
postmodernity, wherein the human heart is not only in conflict with itself, but with the 
language out of which it is necessarily constituted.  Markson limns the paradoxical 
condition of the subject severed from intersubjectivity, and affected not only by the grief 
of bereavement, which can be defined in Heideggarian terms as anxiety for the ontic 
negation of a being (i.e., death), but by loss, which I assert is the ontological ground for 
how Dasein encounters the nothing in anxiety proper.     
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. 
        -- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
 
 The aim of this thesis is to bring the analytic and continental philosophical 
traditions into fruitful dialogue to interpret how David Markson, a writer who has been 
lauded as the last modernist in the tradition of Faulkner, Joyce, and Lowry, understands 
aesthetics, identity, epistemology, and community in the novel Wittgenstein's Mistress.  
More aptly characterized as a postmodernist, Markson's experimental novel signifies a 
paradigmatic shift in American letters and contemporary fiction as a whole.  It is a work 
of increasing interest to scholars concerned with theories of subjectivity and community.  
In line with the Wittgensteinian axiom that "what the solipsist means is quite correct; 
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest [5.62]" (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
68), the present thesis aims to demonstrate how, given the limits of logocentric discourse, 
the gulf between the analytic and continental philosophical traditions can best be bridged 
through the mediation of art, which Martin Heidegger defines in "The Origin of the Work 
of Art" as "truth setting itself to work" (Basic Writings 162).  This is evinced by the way 
in which Markson both anticipates and enacts the direction of recent theoretical debate 
concerned with the synthesis of continental and analytic thought, such as occurs in Lee 
Braver's examination of Heidegger and Wittgenstein in Groundless Grounds (2012).  
Markson's novel, however, "makes manifest" the affinities between these thinkers twenty 
years prior to Braver's text.  That Markson's novel was earlier than Braver's study points 
to the perspicacity of art, and experimental fiction in particular, to predict currents in 
criticism.  Furthermore, this thesis will also bring attention to Markson's innovative work 
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as exemplary of the shift from modernity to postmodernity, wherein the Faulknerian 
human heart is not only in conflict with itself (the values and institutions of modernity), 
but with the very language out of which it is necessarily constituted (the existential-
epistemological crisis of the "failure of language" in postmodernity).     
 Assuming the form of one woman's desultory interior monologue which is later 
revealed to be the very novel we are reading, Wittgenstein's Mistress confronts 
fundamental questions of epistemology and existence--questions of particular relevance 
to the current debate on "postmodern nihilism" and the vaunted "impasse" of 
deconstructive theory.  The problem at stake for Markson  is one of radical doubt; if, as 
Wittgenstein holds in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, "The world is all that is the 
case" (5), and the case is such that, as for the narrator, one believes one's self to be the 
only person in the world, does this then create a world in which, whether or not there are 
in fact other phenomenal beings, one is experientially and therefore ontologically alone?  
Moreover, if there is no objective world outside of our perception, how can we ground 
knowledge or guarantee truth?  Such is the perennial complaint of the skeptic--but rather 
than attempt to answer these questions through the propositional logic of Western 
metaphysics (which Wittgenstein himself spent a lifetime demonstrating the limits of), 
Markson uses his fiction to thematize these often abstruse philosophical paradoxes and, 
instead of concerning himself with offering a solution based on rational argument, 
resituates the problem of solipsism in the primordial and originary experience of loss.   
 Neglected in contemporary criticism of the novel, the loss suffered by the 
narrator--the death of her only son--is a cataclysmic event so damaging that it induces a 
delusional state wherein the aforementioned “case” is one of radical isolation.  As a 
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consequence of her inability to communicate the intensely personal experience of grief, 
the narrator enters a crisis that renders her “mad” and severs her from the intersubjective 
world, effectively emptying this world of all subjectivities but her own.   As such, 
Markson limns the paradoxical condition of the subject affected not only by the grief of 
bereavement, which can be defined in Heideggarian terms as anxiety for the ontic 
negation of a being (i.e., its death), but by loss, which I assert is the ontological ground 
for how There-Being (Dasein) encounters the "nihilation of the nothing" ("What is  
Metaphysics?" 104) in anxiety proper. 
 This thesis is structured as follows: The first chapter will offer a comparison of 
Beckett and Markson, distinguishing Markson's postmodernity from his modernist 
predecessor.  It will set out to describe how Krapp's Last Tape offers particular insight 
into Markson's aesthetic and conclude with an assessment of Markson's place in the 
tradition.  The second chapter will comprise of a close reading of Wittgenstein's Mistress 
and Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?"--exploring the role of anxiety in the novel and 
its preeminence in postmodern fiction. The third chapter will investigate parallels 
between this anxiety, Lord Byron's poetry, and Blanchot's Writing of the Disaster, 
establishing the disaster in the novel as both the loss of intersubjectivity and the absence 
of community.  Having discussed the postmodern in Byron's romanticism, the study will 
conclude with an assessment of the romantic in Markson's postmodernism, arguing that it 
is in and through the work of art that loss becomes communicable. 
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CHAPTER I: THE WORST POSSIBLE GRIEF: (RE)PRESENTING SUBJECTIVITY 
IN "WITTGENSTEIN’S MISTRESS" AND BECKETT’S "KRAPP’S LAST TAPE" 
 
Maybe that's what we look for all our lives, the worst possible grief, to make us truly 
 ourselves before we die. 
       -- Ferdinand Celine, Journey to the End of the Night  
 
 In her perspicacious analysis of David Markson's Wittgenstein's Mistress, 
"Messages: Reading Wittgenstein's Mistress,"  Sherrill E. Grace casually refers to the 
narrator of the novel as a "female Krapp with a typewriter instead of a tape recorder" 
(215), but does not pursue this analogy any further.  A provocative assertion, the parallels 
between Samuel Beckett's Krapp's Last Tape and Markson's novel are striking and 
numerous.  That the influence of Beckett can be seen in Markson's novel is clear, from its 
preoccupation with the Cartesian mind-body split, "But what is there that is not in my 
head?" (Markson 227), to its skepticism about the very possibility of existence outside of 
one's perception.  As Annie Dillard writes in Living by Fiction, "Fiction, like painting, 
intrinsically deals with the nature of perception.  And fiction intrinsically deals with the 
world.  So that finally fiction, if it has anything at all to do with the world as its subject 
matter, will begin to ask, What world?" (57). The analogy to painting is congenial as 
Markon's narrator is herself a painter who, toting a blank canvas throughout the novel, 
laments her inability to paint, "Months I suspect I gazed at that canvas. . . And then after 
months of gazing set fire to the canvas with gasoline one morning and drove away" 
(Markson 24).  Markson's protagonist, however, is the unreliable narrator par excellence; 
whether this event ever took place is less important than the symbolic significance of the 
canvas, which reminds her of "Winters, when the snow covers everything. . . It is almost 
as if one might paint the entire world, and in any manner one wished [my italics]" (47).  
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The suspicion of any metaphysical truth situates Markson squarely in the Beckettian 
tradition of literature that highlights the construction of identity and questions how this 
identity, without recourse to a transcendental essence (be it the Judeo-Christian soul or 
Kantian ego), is constituted.  To this end, memory plays an important role in designating 
the liminal space wherein the desire for metaphysical values and the subject's disbelief in 
them are held in tension.    
 For Krapp, as for Markson's narrator, the possibility of a fixed, immutable truth 
which grounds the self is an enticement that dangles ever before one, and yet, as is 
illustrated by the myth Tantalus, recedes from one's epistemological grasp the moment 
one reaches out to seize it.  Both Krapp and the unnamed author of Markson's meta-
narrative1 find themselves in a similar predicament, with memory functioning as the 
teleological means through which this elusive self can be definitively established.  The 
act of remembering, however, is by its very nature paradoxical--the recalling to presence 
of an absent past.  Therefore, to ground identity on the basis of memory is to found the 
present self on the paradoxical absence out of which it is constituted, for the necessarily 
absent past can only be brought into presence through the reflective interpretive gesture 
of remembering.  That both Markson and Beckett's characters evince a pathological 
obsession with their pasts is therefore telling.  In her aptly titled chapter "The Agony of 
Perceivedness," Lois Oppenheim's description of Krapp's search for identity is equally 
applicable to Markson's mistress, as "Krapp seeks not to obliterate, but rather to reify, the 
                                                            
1 Although critical conventions have established her as "Kate," citing Markson's short story 
"Healthy Kate" as the genesis of the novel, she alternately refers to herself as "Kate," "Helen (of 
Troy)," and "Artemisia," raising the question of how one determines which name is "real" given 
the narrator's unreliability.  Furthermore, she ironically comments "Surely in writing to total 
strangers one would have the courtesy to identify one's self" (Markson 216). 
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perception of self... everywhere in Beckett the nefarious mind-body/subject-object schism 
is problematized as the struggle to reconnect, which is clearly to say the struggle to re-
collect" (The Painted Word: Samuel Beckett's Dialogue with Art 145).  As such, the 
struggle to re-collect is also the struggle to recover a past that is always lost to the 
vagaries of perception and, as past, is necessarily constituted by the residue of loss itself.   
 Intuitively, if the self is not a pre-inscribed essence, then it must be redefined as 
the sum of its experiences.  The sum, however, can be taken as either a coherent unity 
(whole) or a diffuse plurality (fragmented).  In modern fiction, the struggle to re-collect is 
thus the struggle to assemble these fragmented selves--to "re-collect," as it were, the 
disparate constituents of identity.  As such, the past that should confer identity masks the 
simultaneous estrangement which occurs in treating these experiences as static fragments 
(objects) to be "re-collected" in consciousness, when they are properly conceived as 
dynamic events, coextensive with the subject's hermeneutic interpretation of them.  This 
reductive treatment of the past is nonetheless undertaken to preserve the concept of a self 
that is not threatened by the consequences of traditional Cartesian solipsism which, when 
pushed to its logical limits, calls into question not only the existence of the world, but 
also the existence of the subject who perceives it.   
 The above formulation also brings an important distinction to light: the self that 
Krapp attempts to reify is that of the modern empirical subject, while the self of 
Markson's mistress does not preclude the empirical subject, but goes beyond this 
psychological self to reify the postmodern metaphysical subject as understood by the 
theory of solipsism in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Philosophicus. In Transcendence 
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and Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Michael P. Hodges describes Wittgenstein's view of 
subjectivity as follows: 
   Only for a subject can one fact represent another.  Without subjectivity  
  there would be merely an unarticulated totality of facts. Thus subjectivity  
  is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of representation.   
  However, because the Tractatus is concerned with representation as such,  
  not with particular forms of representation, the subjectivity required is in  
  no sense particular.  Rather it is the totality of facts as representable.   
  Therefore, the metaphysical subject cannot be an item in the world, but the 
  limit of the world considered as the limit of all possible representation. . .   
  This distinction between the metaphysical subject and a particular   
  individual subject lies at the center of Wittgenstein's treatment of   
  solipsism.  (76) 
This passage refers to a key proposition in the Tractatus which states, "The philosophical 
self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which 
psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world--not a part of 
it [5.641]" (Wittgenstein 70).  Here the Wittgensteinian perspective on subjectivity shares 
affinity with the phenomenological view espoused by Heidegger's "existentialism," which 
states that, in conceiving of the subject as cogito, Western metaphysics since Descartes 
has essentialized the subject, creating the mind-body split that renders consciousness an 
object among objects.  
 The epistemological consequences of this Cartesian objectification are significant, 
as they draw a decisive difference between the representational view of knowing and the 
8 
 
phenomenological understanding of knowing.  The dilemma of realism versus idealism 
can thus be seen to originate from within the former Cartesian perspective.  The 
representational view of knowing is the natural attitude which is unaware of 
intentionality.  The representational view itemizes existence without taking into account 
the world as transcendent and objects as immediately present (intentionally) in 
consciousness.  The world, then, is disconnected from the cogito that interacts with 
objects (uses them pragmatically), but does not penetrate to their ontological "essence," 
which is not, as in the representational view, noumenal, but rather intentionally 
constituted by a functional relation to being-in-the-world. The Cartesian view therefore 
gives rise to the misapprehension of consciousness as yet another "thing" among "things."   
 The decisive difference that emerges in the phenomenological view is the 
recognition that consciousness is relational; i.e., no world without man, no man without 
world.  Thus, to be conscious is to be conscious "of."  As Heidegger contends, the 
representational view neglects this "of," forgetting the ontological difference between 
ontic beings and ontological Being-as-such (Dasein).  George Kovacs sheds light on the 
necessity of the ontic/existentiell and the ontological/existential distinction, explaining 
that "Ontological questioning is more primordial than the mere ontical way of inquiring 
(for instance, in the sciences) because it is concerned with the problem of the meaning of 
Being...  The existentiell (the ontic) is the bearer of the existential; the existential is 
discerned within (grounded in) the existentiell" (49).  The Heideggarian difference 
between ontic beings and ontological Being has a corollary in Wittgenstein's philosophy 
of solipsism, wherein the empirical subject (psychological) and the metaphysical subject 
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(the "philosophical self" referred to as the "limit of the world" [5.641]) can be divided 
into the existentielle (particular) and existential (foundational) categories, respectively.     
 Both Heidegger's phenomenology and Wittgenstein's logical positivism attempt to 
go beyond the representational view of knowledge, which is unable to overcome the 
dualistic dilemma brought about by the rigid separation of man from world.  As Lee 
Braver explains in Groundless Grounds: 
  One reason for their importance is that they both developed powerful  
  critiques of traditional philosophical theories. Heidegger and later   
  Wittgenstein undermine the  Cartesian conception of the self, reality, and  
  the relationship between them. . .  What is distinctive about Heidegger's  
  and Wittgenstein's work is the way in which  they construct thorough  
  alternatives which do not so much refute Cartesian ideas as prevent them  
  from arising in the first place.  They both try to show that the underlying  
  ideas, far from being self evident and foundational, actually rest on and  
  perpetuate a whole host of misguided presuppositions. (2) 
The presuppositions alluded to by Braver lead to the "scandal" of philosophy--realism 
originates in the naive objectification of things as independent of the perceiving subject's 
consciousness, while idealism is certain only of the "I" and lapses into solipsism when 
confronted with the problem of intersubjectivity.2  As Braver asserts, both Wittgenstein 
                                                            
2 "The 'self of solipsism' is merely the possibility of representation of language... That there is 
representation shows 'the truth of solipsism.'  That is why Wittgenstein says in the famous 
comparison with the visual field that 'nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen 
by an eye' (T 5.633).  We become aware of that only by recognizing that it is a visual field.  
Similarly, 'the truth of solipsism' cannot be inferred from anything that is represented but from the 
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and Heidegger repudiate the dualistic thinking that places an imperious subject over-and-
above a world which he/she is indeed within.  In contrast to this view, these philosophers 
collapse the real/ideal binary that reduces the world to an object, erecting in its place the 
consideration of the world as a field which acts upon the subject and is mutually acted 
upon; therefore, consciousness achieves neither priority nor mastery of it.   
  The most conspicuous parallel between Beckett's Krapp and Markson's narrators 
is their existential situation; both characters find themselves thoroughly isolated, with 
only their thoughts as company in a world divested of other subjectivities.  Although this 
situation is further radicalized in Markson (the unnamed narrator makes explicit claims 
about being the last person in the world), Beckett's Krapp is also the sole inhabitant of his 
world, a world of frustrated expectations and bitter disappointments.  In his self-imposed 
confinement, the seventy-year-old Krapp is a prisoner of his past who is wholly alone but 
for a series of tapes made at various points in his life.  Krapp spends the duration of the 
one-act play listening to the sound of his own recorded voice, pausing at intervals either 
to drink or to criticize the "stupid bastard I took myself for thirty years ago" (62).   
  Although the tapes are meticulously stored and catalogued, Krapp's intentions in 
making them are never expressed; apart from the attempt to anchor the perpetual slippage 
of identity, or to stave off the onset of senility, there is no discernible purpose behind his 
fastidious archiving.  Rather, the tapes that serve as representatives of past selves also 
serve as a means to distance him from them.  Krapp achieves this by repeatedly listening 
to the voice on the recorder until it becomes the experience of someone else; "Hard to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
"fact" that it is represented.  The metaphysical subject is language taken as the possibility of 
representation." (Hodges 84) 
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believe I was ever that young whelp" (58).  This estrangement allows him to control  his 
response to "all that misery" (58), making the pain of memory less acute.3  As John 
Knowles elucidates in "Krapp's Last Tape: The Evolution of a Play," this repetition has a 
dissociative effect.  In a passage that merits quoting at length, Knowles notes its role in 
the play:  
  Repetition lies, in fact, at the very thematic centre of Krapp’s last tape. At  
  seventy years of age, Krapp repeats a ceremony that he has been   
  performing for the past forty-five years. . .  By adopting the mechanical  
  device of the tape-recorder and giving to Krapp the power of instant recall  
  of his own past, Beckett has created a stark confrontation between man’s  
  various selves in which decline, loss, failure, disillusionment and   
  discontinuity are shown concretely. Moreover, in this way, the spectator  
  has become the active agent, listening, observing, and able  himself to  
  assess the width of the chasm that separates Krapp from his former self  
  and judge the strength of his obsession with a portion of his own past that  
  he had earlier rejected as being unworthy of him. . . (1) 
The repetition discussed by Knowles acts as a bulwark against another theme shared by 
Beckett and Markson: the inevitable deterioration of the mind, which in the Cartesian 
paradigm is the seat of the cogito and therefore of the self.  The Cartesian view of the 
self, however, is problematic in that it pictures the world as exterior and the self as 
                                                            
3 Although genetic criticism is outside the scope of this paper, as John Fletcher notes in "Beckett 
as Poet": "Much of Beckett's writing springs directly from a private pain: but it is always well 
disguised.  It is now known, for instance, that there was a "green girl" in his life in Dublin: she 
wore green... in the play Krapp's Last Tape, Beckett asked himself rhetorically, "What remains of 
all that misery? A girl in a shabby green coat, on a railway platform?" (138).  The girl in question 
died of consumption.  
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interior, reifying the old opposition between the material and the ideal.  Once again, this 
opposition also gives rise to the mind-body split which accounts for the frailty of the 
body, but mistakes the mind as insulated from the exterior stimulus of the world, when in 
fact both the mind and body participate in the perceptual event. 
 What is notable in the two authors, however, is the anxiety-fraught relationship of 
their characters to a stable, unified identity that is at once desperately sought and 
continuously rejected.  When emphasis is placed on the past as the exclusive means of 
establishing identity, a destructive stasis ensues; understood properly, Being is not a fixed 
essence but must be conceived as the self-projecting project, i.e., as a being-towards that 
thrives in the dynamic potential of phenomenological ek-stasis (the transcendence of 
Dasein).  Without this understanding, the subject no longer participates in the creation of 
meaning, but becomes the passive observer of a set of facts from which it is removed.  
This perspective is deceptive in that it reinforces a false idea of objectivity, and the notion 
that a "true" version of events exists independent of the perceiving subject. The self, 
however, is never free of prejudices and presuppositions. That the past is simultaneously 
remembered and reconstituted anew in the very act of remembering is obscured by the 
desire for an illusory truth.  The nostalgia for a prelapsarian past before the necessary 
consequences of skepticism, that all "truth" is provisional, and the attendant 
fragmentation that occurs with the advent of modernity leaves an indelible mark on both 
Beckett and Markson's work.   
 In both works there is no Other to disagree with the self's assertions, making the 
self omnipotent but for its responsibility to metaphysical truth and its guilt over failing to 
adhere to this absolute standard; more pointedly, both Beckett and Markson's characters 
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experience distress over not having a standard to adhere to.4  Krapp, the imperious 
subject, is also free to start and stop his tapes at will, omitting details that are injurious or 
contradictory to the self constructed; duly, Markson's narrator displaces the loss of her 
son, preferring to sublimate her grief in the anecdotal trivia which comprises the bulk of 
her manuscript.  However, as shown in the passage below, this equanimous state is 
constantly threatened by the intrusion of bereavement: 
   Leonardo [da Vinci] was also left-handed. And a vegetarian.  And  
   illegitimate. 
   The slides that I took of my mother and father still exist,   
  presumably. 
   Presumably, old slides of [my son] Simon still exist, too. 
   I suppose there is something ironical in my knowing so many thing 
  about  Leonardo, and yet not knowing if the slides that I took of my  
  mother and father, or any of my little boy, still exist. 
   Or, if they exist, where. 
   Time out of mind. (Markson 69) 
                                                            
4 Ewa P. Ziarek's The Rhetoric of Failure investigates this dilemma: "In the context of modernist 
aesthetics, negation can be seen as a process of purification of art from any external significance--
from truth, moral obligations, and social relevance... Yet, in Beckett's texts, negation seems to 
exceed the proper boundaries of aesthetics and to assume disturbing philosophical or cognitive 
implications as well.  Leaving its "proper" area of competence, modern art questions the very 
possibility of truth not only within but also outside the sphere of aesthetics.  It contests the claims 
of rationality by testifying to the disappointing limitations of language or by revealing its perverse 
aberrations.  Bearing the fate that befalls language in general--its shortcomings, deviations, and 
failures--art seems to succumb to mourning [my italics] for the lost truth" (159). 
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A seemingly neutral comment on da Vinci's illegitimacy leads to memories of her own 
parents, and subsequently, back to the endlessly recursive thoughts of her son. As 
exemplary of the novel's Tractarian conceit, the last phrase is nonsensical, but sheds light 
on how ambiguities in language, while logically unintelligible, express certain "truths" 
that logic, however precise, is ill-equipped to grasp.  One such consequence of this 
ambiguity is that even the most innocuous thoughts contain within them the germs of 
loss.   
 This loss is inextricable from the interpretive process by which memory both 
reveals and conceals the presence of absence.  Although "knowledge" (which is not 
fidelity to metaphysical truth but an encounter with the phenomena of the lifeworld) 
originates in the immediate, primordial experience of the pre-reflective, this knowledge 
cannot be brought to the fore without the reflection which describes the initial pre-
linguistic event.  In this way, the past is always already the presence of absence.  
Whereas the pre-reflective is simply an awareness of sensation, the ever present absence 
of the past is necessarily given to reflection as a being-aware-of-awareness.  The structure 
of memory, as such, is fundamentally hermeneutic.  The process of remembering is 
therefore a movement from the pre-linguistic experience to its representation in language.  
This movement is the re-presenting that occurs when the absent past appears before 
consciousness as a recollection of prior events.  As always already absent, the past is 
itself the manifestation of the subject's grounding in loss. 
 However, one important distinction to be made between the works under 
consideration is that the crucial realization that truth is never more than provisional is 
reached only in Markson.  While Krapp enacts a desperate attempt to reach essential 
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identity, he never becomes cognizant of this goal.  Although the unnamed narrator in 
Markson is generally unaware of how her questions about representation and perception 
point to the inability to know truth--if indeed there is a transcendental truth to be known--
there are glimmers of understanding that surpass the ruminations of Krapp.  Whereas 
Markson's narrator asks, "What do any of us ever truly know?" (59), Krapp is troubled by 
a moment on the tapes in which he believes he has apprehended the significance of his 
life: 
  Spiritually a year of profound gloom and indulgence until that memorable  
  night in March at the end of the jetty, in the howling wind, never to be  
  forgotten, when suddenly I saw the whole thing. The vision, at last. This  
  fancy is what I have chiefly to record this evening, againt the day when  
  my work will be done and perhaps no place left in my memory, warm or  
  cold, for the miracle that . . . (hesitates) . . . for the fire that set it alight.  
  What I suddenly saw then was this, that the belief I had been going on all  
  my life, namely--[Krapp switches off impatiently, winds tape foreward,  
  switches on again]. . . (Beckett 60) 
Despite the play ending with his disillusion, the very fact that Krapp revisits this memory 
indicates a nostalgia for metaphysical values.  Whether Krapp ultimately concludes that 
these values are unattainable, to borrow a phrase from Markson's narrator, the futility of 
this search is arrived at "tardily."  The more radical position is taken by Markson, whose 
heroine begins the novel with the confession that she cannot remember "when it was that 
I stopped looking" (18).  Although in this instance she is referring to the search for other 
individuals, and therefore intersubjectivity, this statement can also be interpreted as the 
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postmodern disavowal of absolute truth.  Implicit in the situation of loss is the 
arbitrariness of language which, without recourse to a transcendental meaning, cannot 
guarantee the truth it purports to convey.  Nevertheless, the specter of this transcendence 
is one which haunts Beckett and Markson alike. 
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CHAPTER II: THE WORLD IN SINGING MADE: "WITTGENSTEIN’S MISTRESS" 
AND THE IDEA OF (DIS)ORDER 
  It was her voice that made 
The sky acutest at its vanishing. 
She measured to the hour its solitude. 
She was the single artificer of the world 
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea, 
Whatever self it had, became the self 
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we, 
As we beheld her striding there alone, 
Knew that there never was a world for her 
Except the one she sang and, singing, made. 
               -- Wallace Stevens, "The Idea of Order at Key West" 
 
 The postmodern departure from the nostalgia for metaphysical values (e.g., 
Absolute Truth) seen in Beckett is most evident in Markson's ability to, in 
phenomenological terms, "bracket-out" the question of God.  Engaged in the selfsame 
process as his heroine and Heidegger before her, Markson is also "dismantling" the 
presuppositions of Western metaphysical thought by writing a novel in which the search 
for transcendence becomes a question of ontology and not traditional Judeo-Christian 
theology. 5  Once again, Sherrill E. Grace is astute in her characterization of 
Wittgenstein's Mistress as a "grail quest narrative" wherein "the end, secret, hidden truth, 
the grail--is there from the beginning... Dasein" (213-14).  Grace, however, is unaware of 
just how crucial this concept is to the philosophical inquiry that informs the novel, and 
this becomes increasingly clear with reference to Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?".  
                                                            
5 "Both [Heidegger and Wittgenstein] consider the negative step of disassembling received views 
to be a necessary preparation if their positive work is to avoid perpetuating these perennial 
problems.  For later Wittgenstein, this means disenchanting various "pictures" that have taken 
over one's thinking about a subject, while early Heidegger proposes the Destruktion or 
"dismantling" of traditional theories, a process that would have formed the second half of 
traditional theories, a process that would have formed the second half of Being and Time had he 
completed the work." (Braver 14) 
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Delivered in 1929, this lecture is arguably the most succinct and accessible presentation 
of the metaphysical questions elaborated in Being and Time, and stands as a key text in 
Markson's highly allusive world.  Through his depiction of anxiety in WM, Markson 
poses Heidegger's question of "How is it with the nothing?" (Heidegger 96) from the 
perspective of fiction, which is the only viable alternative once the "legitimacy of the rule 
of 'logic' in metaphysics" (108) is shown to be suspect. 
  As a consequence of her inability to communicate the intensely personal 
experience of grief, Markson's narrator enters a crisis that renders her “mad” and severs 
her from the intersubjective world, effectively emptying this world of all subjectivities 
but her own.   Here, an early essay by fellow novelist David Foster Wallace, "The Empty 
Plenum: David Markson's Wittgenstein's Mistress," is particularly insightful, offering a 
concise summary of the novel's central conceit:  
Markson's Wittgenstein's Mistress succeeds in doing what few 
philosophers glean & what neither myriad biographical sketches nor 
[Bruce] Duffy's lurid revisionism succeeds in communicating: the 
consequences, for persons, of the practice of theory; the difference, say, 
between espousing 'solipsism' as a metaphysical 'position' & waking up 
one fine morning after a personal loss to find your grief apocalyptic, 
literally millennial, leaving you the last and only living thing on earth, 
with only your head, now, for not only company but environment & 
world, an inclined beach sliding toward a dreadful sea. (222) 
Given Wallace's currency as a postmodern writer with a reputation for both artistic and 
commercial success, this essay was recently included in the Dalkey Archive's reprinting 
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of Markson's novel and has become the most widely available piece of criticism on 
Markson's work.  While this has no doubt increased Markson's readership, Wallace also 
makes several misleading assumptions on which he bases his assessment of the novel's 
so-called less effective elements, and these assumptions have been uncontested up to 
now.  
 Although Wallace praises Markson's technical feat of creating a Tractarian world, 
the grieving subject is immediately discounted as a psychological gimmick.  Wallace 
writes, "The death of her son & separation from her husband are also in WM presented as 
a very particular emotional 'explanation' for her 'condition', a peculiar reduction of 
Markson's own to which I kind of object.  The presentation of personal history as present 
explanation... threatens to make WM just another madwoman monologue in the Ophelia-
Rhys tradition..." (232).  Here Wallace makes clear his view that this is the unnecessary 
residue of convention in a novel experimental enough to forego plot, but not radical 
enough to divest its character of motivation.  In a particularly galling turn, Wallace 
accuses Markson of "objectifying" his narrator by "explaining her metaphysical condition 
as emotional/psychical, reducing her bottled missive to a mad monologue by a smart 
woman driven mad by the consequences of culpable sexual agency" (233).   
 Providing little justification for this claim, Wallace takes advantage of the 
fragmentation in the novel to impose a reading that is, ironically, a good deal more 
misogynistic than any of the faults he finds in Markson.  This becomes evident with his 
concluding remark, "I think finally the reason I object to WM's attempt to give Kate's 
loneliness a particular 'motivation' via received feminine trauma is that it's just 
unnecessary" (235).  The "received feminine trauma" at stake is the death of the narrator's 
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only son--that Wallace would characterize this loss in terms of gender betrays his own 
sexism and shows a startlingly myopic perspective, as the loss of Rudy in Ulysses has 
never been dismissed as a "received feminine trauma" with respect to Leopold Bloom.  
Furthermore, in the midst of this fault-finding, the most detrimental impression Wallace 
gives his readers is that Markson is only concerned with the implications of the 
Tractatus.  What Wallace fails to note is the equally important influence of Heidegger, 
whose name appears frequently throughout the novel and who surpasses Wittgenstein in 
that he attempts to speak the unspeakable--the nothing that Wittgenstein passes over in 
silence and that is disclosed "in the fundamental mood of anxiety" (Heidegger 100).   
 To apprehend the radicality of Heidegger's metaphysical inquiry, we must first 
understand that the problem of the nothing is one which is intimately connected to the 
forgetting of the ontological difference between beings and Being as such.  According to 
Heidegger, the search for God is the culmination of Western metaphysics; this "grail 
quest," however, is problematized by the spurious identification of Being with God.  For 
his philosophical predecessors, God was conceived, a priori, as the highest being in a 
hierarchal chain of beings. God, as the highest being, determined the nature and range of 
all beings beneath It (or the Judeo-Christian “Him”); an understanding of God therefore 
provided an understanding of humanity.  Seductively simple and grossly reductive, 
Heidegger is critical of the methodology employed by his forerunners. He contends that, 
in dealing with “beings,” metaphysics forgets Dasein, or Being-as-such, and neglects the 
radicality of this ontological difference.  As George Kovacs in The Question of God in 
Heidegger’s Phenomenology elucidates: 
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The final aspiration of [Heidegger’s] philosophy is not a metaphysical 
perspective leading to the discovery of a highest being (God) as the source 
of all beings, but the comprehension of the hidden meaning of Being as it 
can be reached through the existential analysis of There-Being in Being 
and Time. (53) 
Heidegger argues that metaphysics does not examine its foundations; thus ontology and 
theology become entangled and the concrete world is lost in systematized abstractions. 
Subsequently, the ontological difference is not only neglected, but wholly obscured.  
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is chiefly its inability to describe Dasein or 
There-Being. Before Heidegger, Being was understood in terms of Greek ontology and 
Judaic anthropology: 
The theological definition of the Being of man as created in the image of 
God (Gen. 1:26) is an assimilation of the ancient Greek anthropology 
(man as an entity; it leaves unexplained the human being’s Being). The 
Being of God is (ontologically) interpreted in [Judaic] theology in the 
same way as the Being of man, that is, according to the inadequate Greek 
ontology. . .  In Greek ontology the Being of God and the Being of man 
remain unexamined. (Kovacs 56) 
For Heidegger, man’s Being is ontologically distinct and characterized by “worldliness.” 
There-being is necessarily to-be-in-the-World; its metaphysical “essence” is its existence 
or its relationship with this to-be. If There-being and World are indeed inextricable, then 
the Cartesian notion of a subject-object duality collapses.  The ego is consequently 
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stripped of its former prestige as executor of the imperious will that stands over and 
against objective reality. 
 In rendering this naïve realism unattainable, Heidegger brings to the fore its 
epistemic nostalgia for a world in which sign and signified are granted an a priori 
congruence. Given that these metaphysical assumptions have led philosophy astray, 
Heidegger does no less than attempt to dispense with the realism/idealism dichotomy by 
reframing the dilemma in terms of temporality.  As both an ontological and ontic 
condition for There-Being, temporality discloses how the phenomenological principle of 
man-World relatedness shifts the concerns of philosophy from an exhausted metaphysics 
to There-Being’s finitude.  
 In metaphysics, God is posited as a divine being that, qua Creator, is the fount of 
ontological Being for all phenomenal beings.  However, There-Being is finite (i.e., 
towards-death) and defined by its quintessential temporality; hence God, as atemporal, 
cannot have There-being—the There-Being common to “Man” and the focus of 
Heidegger’s study. The metaphysical notion of God is incongruous with There-being; it 
indicates the anthropomorphizing of the statement “God exists” because for beings 
existence is predicated on the temporality which God transcends.  Furthermore, with 
respect to the nothing, Heidegger writes "if God is God he cannot know the nothing, 
assuming that the "Absolute" excludes all nothingness" ("What is Metaphysics?" 107-8).  
Therefore, while Heidegger's analysis does not preclude God, it does entail 
methodological atheism with respect to the question of Being: 
Heidegger’s definition of the very nature and task of philosophical 
thinking may be described as a methodological atheism; it is neither “for” 
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nor “against” but rather “without” God (as the last and first explanation of 
being and thinking); it comes from and returns to Being (and not from and 
to God, who cannot be forced into the categories or concepts of 
philosophical reflection). (Kovacs 201) 
Since the metaphysical tradition cannot overcome itself, it must be rethought outside 
itself with Dasein as its point of departure. 
 It is worth noting here that in one of the narrator's most candid moments, she 
dismisses the "depression" (Markson 71) that causes her to stop working on her 
manuscript (the novel we are reading) with the explanation, "It will pass. In the meantime 
there is little one can do about it.   Anxiety being the fundamental mood of existence, as 
somebody once said, or undoubtedly should have said" (72).   Exemplary of Markson's 
highly allusive technique, after several intervening references to other artists and writers 
including Pablo Picasso, Dylan Thomas, Helen Frankenthaler, and most significantly, the 
Mexican poet Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz,6 the narrator is suddenly triggered to remember 
who wrote the phrase:  
   Though perhaps it was Kierkegaard who said that, about anxiety  
  being the fundamental mood of existence.   
   If it was not Kierkegaard it was Martin Heidegger.   
   In either case I suspect there is something ironical in my being able 
  to guess that something was said by Kierkegaard, or by Martin   
  Heidegger. . . (72) 
                                                            
6 "Mexico having appeared as reasonable a place in which to begin to look as any, however, 
whether I was mad or not... And even if one surely does not have to be mad in the least, in being 
drawn to the grave of one's only child." (Markson 224) 
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This apparent confusion belies the associative connection between the two thinkers who, 
whatever philosophical movement they are ultimately grouped with, share particular 
concerns about the subject's relation to the world and finitude which commentators have 
traced through the genealogy of existentialism.  For Heidegger, however, it is not solely 
the experience of freedom as unactualized potential that characterizes anxiety, but also 
the "nihilation of the nothing" (104).     
 That this analysis of anxiety is important to a more complex reading of Markson's 
novel than Wallace permits becomes clear with further recourse to "What is 
Metaphysics?".  Apart from her belief that she is the last person in the world, her 
circumstances are eerily mundane.   In fact, the most accurate characterization of her 
actions and attitude when she is not "depressed" or "anxious" may be one of profound 
boredom, "doing such things as rolling hundreds and hundreds of tennis balls down the 
Spanish Steps, or waiting for seventeen hours for each of her seventeen wristwatches to 
buzz before dropping each into the Arno" (230-1).  For Heidegger, however, the 
experience of boredom attains an especial significance with respect to Dasein:  
No matter how fragmented our everyday existence may appear to be, 
however, it always deals with beings in a unity of the "whole," if only in a 
shadowy way.  Even and precisely when we are not actually busy with 
things or ourselves, this "as a whole" overcomes us--for example in 
genuine boredom.  Boredom is still distant when it is only this book or that 
play, that business or this idleness that drags on.  It irrupts when "one is 
bored."  Profound boredom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our 
existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and human beings and 
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oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference.  This boredom 
reveals beings as a whole. (99) 
Whereas Heidegger uses fog to evoke this pervasive indifference, Markson articulates 
this removal of all things and human beings with images of snow:  
   Winters when the snow covers everything, leaving only that  
  strange calligraphy of the spines of trees, it is a little like closing one's  
  eyes. 
   Certainly reality is altered. 
   One morning you awaken and all color has ceased to exist. (47) 
Significantly, Heidegger goes on to call this boredom a mood in which "this revealing--
far from being merely incidental--is also the basic occurrence of  Dasein" (100).  
Nevertheless, Heidegger also makes an important distinction between this attunement and 
that of anxiety, writing "But just when moods of this sort bring us face to face with 
beings as a whole they conceal from us the nothing  [my italics] we are seeking" (100).  
Boredom is therefore a mere negation of the totality of beings. 
 As with There-Being, which up to Heidegger had been construed as the Kantian 
ego or Judeo-Christian soul but remained a mere "thing" with transcendental qualities, 
the metaphysical tradition has attempted to conceptualize the nothing in terms of 
negation, deriving its idea of the nothing from the negation of a particular thing.  Taking 
this flaw in Western metaphysical thinking as his point of departure, Heidegger argues 
for a new interpretation of the nothing: 
  Is the nothing given only because the 'not,' i.e., negation is given?  Or is it  
  the other way around?  Are negation and the 'not' given only because the  
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  nothing isgiven?  That has not been decided; it has not even been raised  
  expressly as a question.  We assert that the nothing is more original than  
  the 'not' and negation. (97) 
While the ontological difference between negation and the nothing may at first appear to 
be an example of the "bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language" 
(Philosophical Investigations 100) that Wittgenstein defines philosophy as a battle 
against, it is precisely this distinction that comes to the fore in WM as a metaphysical 
issue which must be thought beyond the limits of traditional metaphysical thinking.  As 
with Heidegger's reevaluation of the ontological difference between negation and the 
nothing, anxiety is not only a particular psychological state, but an ontological 
experience. 
 Contrary to the expectations a reader may have for someone who professes to be 
the sole survivor on a planet devoid of all life, she does not feel threatened by the end 
which others must certainly have met.  That the world is stripped of all subjectivities but 
her own is an "absurdity" which she, like Kafka's Gregor Samsa before her, accepts 
without question--only for Markson it is not grotesque or fantastic, but a situation terrible 
in its everydayness, "One manner of being alone simply being different than another 
manner of being alone, being all that she would finally decide this came down to, as 
well" (Markson 231).  Most conspicuous--and, paradoxically, conspicuous in the fact that 
it is wholly absent--is her total lack of fear.  In a passage that merits quoting at length, 
Heidegger explains how psychological anxiety (ontic) differs from existential anxiety 
(ontological): 
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   Does such an attunement in which man is brought before the  
  nothing itself, occur in human existence? 
This can and does occur although rarely enough and only for a 
moment in the fundamental mood of anxiety.  By this anxiety we do not 
mean the quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness, 
which all too readily comes over us.  Anxiety is basically different from 
fear.  We become afraid in the face of this or that particular being that 
threatens us in this or that particular respect.  Fear in the face of something 
is also in each case a fear for something in particular.  Because fear 
possesses this trait of being "fear in the face of" and "fear for," he who 
fears and is afraid is captive to the mood in which he finds himself.  
Striving to rescue himself from this particular thing, he becomes unsure of 
everything else and completely loses his head. (100) 
As such, psychological anxiety can be said to be the common anxiety "in the face of," 
and ontological anxiety that which brings one before the nothing.   As corollaries of this 
difference, in much the same way that the existentiell and existential modes of anxiety 
obtain, the protagonist's bereavement is also experienced at both the ontic and ontological 
level.  The particular "thing" that Markson's narrator strives to rescue herself from is the 
reality of her son's death.  To prevent herself from experiencing this grief, she "loses her 
head" by becoming mad.  From a psychological standpoint, this phenomenon may be best 
explained with recourse to Freud. 
Having demonstrated his familiarity with Freud in the critical study Malcolm 
Lowry's Volcano: Myth, Symbol, Meaning, Markson is likely to have encountered Freud's 
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theory of parapraxis, or the infamous "Freudian slip," prior to the composition of WM.7 
Although the popular notion involves only errors in speech, in “Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life”  Freud delineates several of the more obscure parapraxial categories 
relevant to interpreting WM, including errors in memory, and significantly, mistakes in 
reading.  In each case of parapraxis, the crux of the phenomenon is that the error, be it in 
speech, memory, or reading, reveals a powerful unconscious motive on the part of the 
subject.  In WM, this unconscious motive manifests itself in the narrator's repression of 
her son’s death, "There being surely as many things one would prefer never to remember 
as there are those one would wish to" (Markson 221).  In the introductory chapter entitled 
"The Forgetting of Proper Names," Freud describes the process as follows:   
I can no longer conceive the forgetting of the name Signorelli as an 
accidental occurrence.  I must recognize in this process a motive.  There 
were motives which actuated the interruption in the communication of my 
thoughts... and which later influenced me to exclude from my 
consciousness the thought connected with them… that is, I wanted to 
forget something, I repressed something. To be sure, I wanted to forget 
something other than the name of the master of Orvieto; but this other 
thought brought about an associative connection between itself and this 
name, so that my act of volition missed the aim, and I forgot the one 
against  my will, while I intentionally wished to forget the other. (37)  
                                                            
7 Freud is also mentioned in the same context of anxiety in Markson's later novel Reader's Block: 
"Despite decades of self-analysis, Freud was forever so anxiety-ridden about missing trains that 
he would arrive at a station as much as an hour ahead of time" (12). 
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This passage is significant in view of the fact that she not only has trouble remembering 
whether Kierkegaard or Heidegger wrote "Anxiety is the fundamental mood of 
existence," but more importantly, the name of the son she buried, "Time out of mind. 
Meaning that one can even momentarily forget the name of one's only child" (Markson 
9).  For the narrator, then, the motive concealed and discovered by her errors is 
necessarily a reconciliation with the loss of her deceased son.  The subsequent repression 
of this loss occurs because the narrator is unable to deal with the responsibility she feels 
for her child's death "even if it was nobody's fault that Lucien died after all" (225).  
However irrational, this responsibility for the death of her son, and the concomitant guilt, 
is inescapable except from "behind the veil of madness [that] protected [her]" (47) from 
her grief and forestalled the mourning of her loss.8  One of the few expressions that is not 
repeated over the course of the novel, "veil of madness" is also a significant phrase 
because of its ironic theological overtones--a repentant sinner, she "takes the veil" of 
madness to atone for an imagined crime in a world where there is no deity to absolve her.   
 Nevertheless, this psychological (or ontic) condition is not the only dimension of 
her madness.  In the next chapter I will explore how by understanding exile as "the 
receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety" (Heidegger 101), the 
                                                            
8 As described by Philippe Ariès in Western Attitudes Toward Death: from the Middle Ages to the 
Present, the advent of the Romantic era also saw a significant change in mourning practices: "The 
19th century is the era of mourning which the psychologist of today calls hysterical mourning.  
And it is true that at times they almost reached the point of madness, as in the story of Mark 
Twain, "The Californian's Tale," dated 1893, in which a man who after 19 years had never 
accepted his wife's death celebrated the anniversary date of her death by awaiting her impossible 
return in the company of sympathetic friends who helped him maintain his illusion... This 
exaggeration of mourning in the nineteenth century is indeed significant.  It means survivors 
accepted the death of another person with greater difficulty than in the past.  Henceforth, and this 
is a very important change, the death that is feared is no longer so much the death of the self as 
the death of another, la mort de toi, thy death" (67-68). 
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definition of exile can be broadened from the ontic exclusion of a particular being from a 
specific locale/temporality to encompass an ontological event that occurs in Being as 
such.  This can be seen in the novel as the protagonist is not estranged from a particular 
culture/community, but from the very possibility of community itself.  
 In the Tractatus Wittgenstein expresses the view that "Death is not an event in 
life: We do not live to experience death [6.4311]" (87).  Similarly for Heidegger, we 
cannot experience our death but we can experience the loss of Being that occurs in 
anxiety and which attunes us to the nothing.  In Markson we can therefore revise the 
Heideggerian formula from a being-towards-death to a being-towards-loss; while death 
may be the horizon of Being, the finitude which gives meaning to the existential self-
projecting project, it is always experienced proximally and cannot be experienced as 
"mine," for it is always the death of another (of-and-for-an-Other). Loss, however, 
communes with the nothing, grounding the very possibility of "my death” in the 
"nihilation of the nothing" (Heidegger 104).   
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CHAPTER III: THE WRITING OF THE DISASTER: (IN)SCRIBING 
POSTMODERNITY IN LORD BYRON’S “DARKNESS” AND “WITTGENSTEIN’S 
MISTRESS” 
 
The disaster--experience none can undergo--obliterates (while leaving perfectly intact) our 
relation to the world as presence or as absence; it does not thereby free us, however, from this 
obsession with which it burdens us: others. 
     -- Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster 
 
 In the only comprehensive critical work available on the fiction of David 
Markson, This is Not a Tragedy: The Works of David Markson, Françoise Palleau-Papin 
offers a persuasive argument for the influence of Walt Whitman on Wittgenstein's 
Mistress. An astute analysis of the multiple intertextual allusions to Whitman's poetry, 
Palleau-Papin  paves the way for the presentation of compelling evidence for the 
influence of another key literary figure, namely Whitman's predecessor, Lord Byron.  
Though seldom regarded as "postmodern," the apocalyptic and exilic themes of Byron's 
poem "Darkness" can be read as anticipating the loss of metaphysical values (e.g., 
Absolute Truth, God, or the secular source of essential meaning, Community) that 
becomes fully realized in the unpeopled universe of Markson's novel.  Moreover, whether 
Markson consciously drew from the poem or not, the same stark images of watchfires, 
burnt homes, and extinction pervade both works.9  However, while a genetic argument 
that offers incontrovertible proof of this connection may be of some interest to Byron and 
Markson scholars alike, this approach obscures the purpose of contemporary literary 
criticism, which is not to arrive at the author's intentions, but to further critical analysis 
and open the literature under consideration to new interpretive possibilities.  To this end, 
                                                            
9 According to Markson Reading Markson, a website devoted to recording instances of Markson's 
marginalia, he did in fact own a copy of The Selected Letters of Lord Byron inscribed "Lord 
Markson";  Byron is also referenced  twice in his later novel Reader's Block (42, 83). 
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a postmodern reading of "Darkness" is useful in demonstrating  how, for both Byron and 
Markson, the loss of metaphysical values is inextricable from the topos of disaster. 
 As Geoff Payne points out in Dark Imaginings: Ideology and Darkness in Lord 
Byron's Poetry, it is tempting to read "Darkness" biographically since "1816 saw the very 
public collapse of Byron's marriage and. . . The year also saw the beginning of his 
European exile" (33); however, as I will argue, this narrow interpretation excludes a 
richer range of readings for the postmodern subject.  The necessity of biographical details 
to ground one's hermeneutic has heretofore been overstated by critics for whom such 
readings further their ideological claims.  For these critics, it is in their interest to belabor 
historical context as the sole fount of meaning and to denigrate more radical readings 
which, by virtue of their methodology, implicitly question the authority of established 
approaches to textual analysis.  Although Payne later notes that "a different symbolic 
process which organizes [Byron's] ideas within the artistic framework of the lyric" (34) is 
at work, Payne's preceding characterization of "Darkness" as a "manifest  response to the 
developing chaos in his personal life" (34) frames his argument, capitulating to the 
institutional mandate for historical evidence and placating opponents who would 
otherwise object to the relevance of a reading where gender featured prominently (despite 
its timeliness for feminist and queer theorists).  That some fifty years have passed since 
Roland Barthes published "Death of the Author" seems lost on contemporary critics who 
appear more concerned with exhuming bodies than with answering questions about how 
we read and why, questions for which a facile recourse to authorial intent often fails to 
provide satisfactory answers. 
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 While the historical fact remains that 1816 is both the year that Byron's marriage 
disintegrated and the year he composed "Darkness," to determine that the poem emerges 
solely from his need to vent frustrations with his then wife is reductive in a twofold 
sense:  On the one hand, this approach attenuates the range of interpretive possibilities, 
locating meaning in a causal chain that adheres to the  rules of propositional logic; and 
two, such a reading reduces the literary theorist to the role of historian, when philosophy 
is the vocation of the theorist proper.  As stated in Alice Levine's "Introduction" to the 
Norton Critical Edition of Byron's Poetry and Prose, "exile in Byron's poems is not 
merely a literal or dramatic circumstance but is symbolic of a personal and societal 
alienation, a psychological and metaphysical [my italics] condition" (xvi).  That Byron's 
"personal and societal alienation" spring from the material circumstances of 1816 is an 
easily established and obvious conclusion; it is the metaphysical aspect of Byron's exile 
which transcends the biographical details of his life and situates him among the 
postmodern literature of disaster. 
 As a narrative of human extinction, "Darkness" typifies what French theorist 
Maurice Blanchot terms "the writing of the disaster."   In The Writing of the Disaster, a 
work of criticism that blends literary theory and philosophy (in particular, Derrida, 
Heidegger, and Wittgenstein), Blanchot examines the concept of disaster, its role in the 
creation of texts, and its significance for the modern epoch.  For Blanchot, the disaster is 
both figurative and literal in that the "writing" is not only the act of bearing witness (as 
by a scribe) to the disaster, but is also that which is written by the disaster itself.  
Although Byron's "Darkness" appears most readily to satisfy the first condition by 
recording apocalyptic events that echo the Book of Revelations--as with his capitalization 
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of "Famine" (69), a potential reference to the Four Horseman, and "Fiend," (69) 
suggestive of  the Antichrist--"Darkness" satisfies the latter condition as well.  By 
producing a system of signs, or "writing," that evokes the loss of metaphysical values, 
what is tacitly inscribed by the annihilation depicted in "Darkness," i.e., written by the 
disaster, is the coming existential-epistemological crisis of postmodernity.  For critics 
who would argue that, on the basis of Byron's chronology alone, the attribution of 
"postmodern" is specious, Levine responds: 
 Byron shares with many modern and postmodern writers a postwar 
consciousness and sense of a moribund society.  He anticipated James 
Joyce in taking as his materials the contemporary social, political, cultural, 
and linguistic landscape, at the center of which is situated his own 
perceiving consciousness--the product, exile, and conscience of his 
people.  Like Joyce, Baudelaire, Beckett, and Nabakov (all of them writers 
of exile), Byron adopts a range of postmodern attitudes and rhetorical 
strategies:  playfulness, sly narrative poses, intertextuality, artificiality, the 
absurd, and indeterminacy. (xviii-xix) 
Byron's "Darkness" therefore functions in much the same fashion as the Biblical book 
with which it shares visionary resonances--as a text in the prophetic mode, anticipating 
that the absence of metaphysical values will become the dominant theme of postmodern 
thought.   
 For Byron, the trauma caused by the loss of metaphysical values cannot be 
imagined except as a radical "Darkness"; the eclipse of the rationalist and logocentric 
views of the Enlightenment with which Romantics found themselves disillusioned.  As 
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Jane Stabler asserts in "Byron, Postmodernism and Intertextuality," this disillusion was 
analogous to postmodernity's rejection of "wholeness," which is predicated on the 
essentialism of Western metaphysical thinking and still sought by modernists for whom 
the postmodern view is deemed bleak: 
   . . . Both [Byron and Shelley] were wary (as Lacanian theory  
  would be) of fantasies of wholeness, but while Shelleyan poetry reaches  
  towards 'The One' which remains, Byron's verse follows 'the many' which  
  'change and pass', contemplating nostalgically or sardonically the prospect 
  of ideal resolution. 
   Shelley and Byron's disagreement on the matter of ideal versus  
  'peopled'  existence offers a way of conceptualising the contested ground  
  between modernism and postmodernism. (867) 
Similar to the distinction drawn by Stabler between Shelley and Byron, David Markson's 
suspicion of any metaphysical truth situates him squarely in the Beckettian tradition of 
literature which highlights the construction of identity and questions how this identity, 
without recourse to a transcendental essence (be it the Judeo-Christian soul or Kantian 
ego), is constituted.  Whereas  the desire for metaphysical values and the subject's 
disbelief in them are held in tension by Beckett's modernity, for the unnamed narrator of 
Markson's Wittgenstein's Mistress, these metaphysical values are so thoroughly 
obliterated as to be beyond mere "disbelief"; echoing Byron's "The world was void" (69), 
in Markson's postmodern world, there are simply no longer any values left to negate.   As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, it is worth remembering here that the narrator often ponders the 
phrase "anxiety being the fundamental mood of existence" (Markson 72), but mistakenly 
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imputes this phrase to Kierkegaard, whose analysis of dread is known to have influenced 
Heidegger.  For Byron, then, the lines "Morn came and went--and came, and brought no 
day, / And men forgot their passions in the dread / Of this their desolation" (6-8) have an 
especial significance when read through a phenomenological lens, as it is in the midst of 
this "dread" (Angst) that one experiences the "desolation" of the nothing.   
 Subsequently, if the "disaster" in Blanchot is interpreted as trauma at both the 
ontic and ontological level, then Markson's protagonist can be said to experience a 
twofold loss: One, the death of her son (ontic/existentiell disaster); and two, the 
subsequent disappearance of other beings, or the absence of community 
(ontological/existential disaster) which is also envisioned in Byron's poem.  Both events 
give rise to the inability to communicate, as the experience of loss exceeds the boundaries 
of logocentric propositional language and thereby results in its disastrous failure.  
 This failure of language is intimately connected to the failure of logic.  From a 
Heideggerian perspective, logic is an obstacle to the authentic thinking process.  As 
Heidegger states in "What is Metaphysics?": 
…The nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa. If the power of the 
intellect in the field of inquiry into the nothing and into Being is shattered, 
then the destiny of the reign of “logic” in philosophy is thereby decided. 
The idea of “logic” itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more original 
questioning. (105)  
In this respect, both Byron's "Darkness" and Markson's novel enact Derridean 
poststructural theory in which meaning is no longer conceived as a pre-inscribed essence, 
but generated through opposition and deferral.    
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 For example, the mind's fragility figures prominently in Wittgenstein's Mistress, 
where repetition creates an ominous sense of linguistic futility and fractured perception.  
For Byron and Markson, however, conventional notions of binary pairs such as "dark" 
and "light," "sane" and "insane," etc., are inadequate and unstable.  This essentialist 
taxonomy is not only vague, but has dire ramifications because it is sustained by the 
axioms of Aristotelian logic in which the principle of the excluded middle (wherein only 
one choice can be actualized to the exclusion of the other) and the principle of non-
contradiction (for a proposition to be rational it must be either true or false) are sovereign 
and irrefutable.  As such, the logocentric approach to insanity that fails to define it as 
anything other than that which is "not-sane" is as ineffective as defining "darkness" as 
"not-light." For Heidegger, the aforementioned binaries of sane/insane and dark/light 
collapse10 in the experience of "the nothing," which cannot be grasped by the logic of 
negation, but must be understood as a radically primordial, prelinguistic experience.  
 Given that the prelapsarian one-to-one correspondence between signifier and 
signified is no longer possible after the loss of metaphysical values that attends the 
"disaster" of poststructural critique, the deeply subjective experience of the nothing is 
incommunicable and results in radical isolation.  An existential-epistomological crisis 
follows in which the individual is simultaneously isolated (pure subjectivity) and effaced 
(the self is only self in relation to Other).  The ultimately untranslatable, inexpressible 
experience of the nothing throws this conflict into relief.  "Madness," as such, becomes 
                                                            
10 These binaries collapse for Foucault as well: "But while error is merely non-truth... madness 
fills the void of error with images, and links hallucinations by affirmation of the false.  In a sense, 
it is thus plenitude, joining to the figures of night the powers, to the forms of fantasy the activity 
of the waking mind; it links the dark content with forms of light.  But is not such plenitude 
actually the culmination of the void?" (Madness and Civilisation 106) 
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the search for intersubjectivity; an intersubjectivity that paradoxically occurs outside the 
mediation of language and is therefore unattainable.    
  Nevertheless, the narrator is incessantly drawn to the "inconsequential 
perplexities" (Markson 88) that emerge when meaning and reference are brought under 
scrutiny, such as whether the house she has burned to the ground can still be referred to 
as a "house" when all that remains is smoke and ash:   
   I still notice the burned house, mornings, when I walk along the  
  beach. 
   Well, obviously I do not notice the house. What I notice is what  
  remains of the house. 
   One is still prone to think of a house as a house, however, even if  
  there is not remarkably much left of it. (11) 
Throughout the novel she returns frequently to this image, which is not only 
psychologically arresting, but also strikes at questions of ontological significance about 
the subject's way of being-in-the-world.  As the novel progresses, this tenuous connection 
between appearance and so-called reality becomes increasingly complex and emotionally 
charged; smoke is no longer mere smoke, but the signifier of a former life.  This idea is 
evoked by the thought "where was my own house when all I was seeing was the smoke 
from my potbellied stove but was thinking, there is my house?" (212) in which the deeply 
felt loss is concealed by the surreal disjunction that is produced when the ambiguities of 
meaning and reference undermine the truth value of propositional statements.  
Furthermore, the narrator explains that she has burned two houses to the ground: 
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   Why I burned the first one I would rather not go too deeply into.  I  
  did that quite deliberately, however. 
   That was in Mexico, on the morning after I had visited poor  
  Simon's grave. (14) 
Why she would "rather not go too deeply into" her reasons for burning the house is 
because this forces her to face the irrevocable loss of her son11--a loss which exceeds the 
boundaries of rational language and therefore cannot be communicated with the precision 
over which she obsesses.  This burning of homes has a compelling parallel in "Darkness":  
    And they did live by watchfires--and the thrones, 
    the palaces of crowned kings--the huts, 
The habitations of all things which dwell,  
Were burnt for beacons; cities were consumed,  
And men were gathered round their blazing homes 
To look once more into each other's faces. (10-15) 
The existential situation of Markson's narrator, however, is one in which she finds herself 
radically isolated,  unable to illuminate the face of the Other, with only her thoughts as 
company in a world divested of all subjectivities but her own.  This situation is presented 
in extremis by  Markson as the protagonist does not simply feel alone, but makes explicit 
                                                            
11 "The example of the Ancients, their piety toward the dead as shown by the remnants of their 
tombs as at Pompeii and by the eloquence of their funeral inscriptions, was called to mind... Their 
tombs therefore began to serve as a sign of their presence after death, a presence that did not 
necessarily derive from the concept of immortality central to religions of salvation such as 
Christianity.  It derived instead from the survivors' unwillingness to accept the departure of their 
loved one [my italics]." (Aries 70) 
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claims that she is the last person in the world and cannot remember "when it was that I 
stopped looking" (Markson 18).    
  Moreover,  a compelling connection to the watchfires is present, as the unnamed 
narrator mentions "sitting above the [Scamander] one evening on the excavated walls, 
and gazing toward the channel, I was almost positive one could still see the Greek 
watchfires, being lighted along the shore" (Markson 13).  Not only is this thematically 
relevant, depicting  the hopelessness of the last woman who, in her desperation, 
fantasizes about contact with an absent community, but it also makes the case for a 
speculative allusion to Byron since the narrator speaks of "the Dardanelles, which used to 
be called the Hellespont.  The name of Troy had been changed too, naturally.  Hisarlik, 
being what it was changed to" (8).  Here Markson may be inviting the reader to make the 
allusive leap to Byron, suggesting "Written after Swimming to Asbestos" by referring to 
the "Hellespont."  Furthermore, this reference is notable because in the preceding lines 
she recalls that "The name of the river at Hisarlik is the Scamander" (13) and, in the line 
prior to that, mentions that the plaque on the house where John Keats died reads 
"Giovanni Keats" (13).  Therefore, it is as she sitting above the Scamander, thinking 
about the name Giovanni (which itself contains a resonance with Don Giovanni, or Don 
Juan), that the image of watchfires comes to her.  Is it not possible, then, that in this web 
of allusions, the initial image is borne of her association with Byron's "Darkness"?  In any 
event, the line "And they did live by watchfires" (10) provides a succinct representation 
of the existential quandary at the heart of the novel.  In addition,  that "the habitations of 
all things which dwell / Were burnt for beacons" (12-13) shows another connection, as 
she inadvertently creates a watchfire by burning her beachfront home, even after having 
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disavowed the search for other beings.  Near the novel's close, the watchfires are 
mentioned again, with her stating that she has "taken to building fires" and pretending 
that "the fires are Greek watchfires" (239).  Again, by using the verb "build" instead of 
"set," Markson calls attention to the fact that meaning and reference are often slippery--in 
its negation, the house that she has dismantled for kindling is ironically "rebuilt" as a fire.   
 In yet another ironic turn, the preceding pages reveal that what we are reading is 
her "autobiography."  She muses: 
   As a matter of fact, it might even be an interesting, novel in its  
  way. 
   Which is to say a novel about somebody who woke up one   
  Wednesday or Thursday to discover that there was apparently not one  
  other person left in the world. 
   Well or not even one seagull, either.  (230) 
In her exile from beings in their totality, the world is, as described by Byron, "Seasonless, 
herbless, treeless, manless, lifeless-- / A lump of death--a chaos of hard clay" (71-72).  
Although there are still trees in the narrator's world, whether there are indeed other 
people, or even seagulls,  is irrelevant; she is the sole inhabitant of her exilic world and 
sole arbiter of its rules.  By understanding exile as "the receding of beings as a whole that 
closes in on us in anxiety" (Heidegger 101), the definition of exile can be broadened from 
the ontic exclusion of a particular being from a specific locale/temporality to encompass 
an ontological event that occurs in Being as such.  This can be seen in the novel as the 
protagonist is not estranged from a particular culture/community, but from the very 
possibility of Community itself.  Applying Wittgenstein's theory of private language use 
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as the paradigm for the narrator's private language game,  Sue-Im Lee's "Community as 
Multi-Party Game: Private Language in David Markson's Wittgenstein's Mistress" 
describes how solipsistic absence of agreement causes the narrator to exist in either a 
state of omnipotence (the game succeeds) or madness (the game fails): 
  Markson offers a parable of fictional world-making as the most successful  
  rendition of a private language game.  In her freedom to recount the world  
  however she wishes, she is free to make the world however she wishes.   
  Thus in ["Kate's"] tales of being the last person alive on earth, there is a  
  direct connection between her linguistic omnipotence and her ontological  
  omnipotence. (155) 
In turn, the paradoxical state of madness and omnipotence which the extinction of other 
beings (i.e., subjectivities) confers upon Markson's narrator, the inheritor of an "empty 
plenum," is also evoked by the personification of Darkness that occurs in the last lines of 
Byron's poem, where he writes "Darkness had no need / Of aid from them--She was the 
Universe" (81-82).   
 As a narrative of human extinction, the contradictory personification of Darkness 
presents an intriguing aporia.  Where one expects to see the impersonal pronoun, "It," we 
are instead presented with the personal "She"; it is thus through the destruction of 
intersubjectivity that a new subjectivity emerges--Darkness as pure subjectivity, not 
merely sufficient unto itself but omnipotent.  Here Darkness is triumphant as opposed to 
nihilistic; solitude is liberating as opposed to lonely and oppressive.  As such, Darkness 
may be without order, but the ensuing "chaos" (Byron 72) is also freedom from 
communal law and responsibility to the Other for whom Darkness has "no need / Of aid" 
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(81-82).   In a similar vein, that "Morn came and went--and came, and brought no day" 
(Byron 6)  parallels a segment of Markson's novel, wherein the narrator mentions that 
"the first snow had come and gone" (233) and goes on to describe a striking inversion of 
Byron's "all was black" (21): 
   Still, on the morning after [the snow] fell, the trees were writing a  
  strange calligraphy against the whiteness. 
   For that matter, the sky was white, too, and the dunes were hidden, 
  and the beach was white all the way down to the water's edge. 
   So that almost everything I was able to see then, was like that old  
  lost nine-foot canvas of mine, with its opaque  four white coats of gesso. 
   Making it almost as if one could have newly painted the entire  
  world one's self, and in any manner one wished. (233) 
In this instance, historical context for "Darkness" is particularly useful, given that the 
poem was composed after the eruption of a volcano which, like the snow in Markson's 
novel, blotted out the sky with a tremendous quantity of ash.  Moreover, it is notable that 
in this revelatory moment the unnamed narrator who has been lamenting her inability to 
paint, can now paint "the entire world one's self, and in any manner one wished," much 
akin to Byron's last line, "She was the Universe" (83).  She also observes that the "trees 
were writing a strange calligraphy against the whiteness," as though the writing of the 
disaster was thrown into relief by the experience of pure subjectivity. 
 As such, while there is strong evidence that the imagery in "Darkness" influenced 
Markson, whether a genetic argument for Byron’s impact on Markson can be made is 
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beside the point.  The parallels between these works, be they conscious or unconscious, 
speak to a more compelling case for literature's preoccupation with the disastrous loss of 
metaphysical values.  Byron’s “Darkness” is thus the most radical of his poems because it 
represents a break with all metaphysical values, including Community and even man’s 
communion with nature, which is arguably the strongest current in Romantic thinking 
and a defining trope of the movement.  In this way, Byron's relationship to postmodernity 
is similar to that of Marlowe's relationship to imperialism in Heart of Darkness; as 
elucidated by Edward Said in Culture and Imperialism, "there is no use looking for other, 
non-imperialist alternatives; the system has simply eliminated them and made them 
unthinkable" (23).  For Byron, although he lacks the language in which to "think" 
postmodernity, the terms of his Romanticism express a conflict with the "system" of 
language that finds itself yoked to the rule of logic. 
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CONCLUSION 
Let us sculpt in hopeless silence all our dreams of speaking. 
      -- Fernando Pessoa, The Book of Disquiet 
 
 In a 1990 interview for The Review of Contemporary Fiction, "A Conversation 
with David Markson," Markson discloses that his working title for Wittgenstein's 
Mistress was "Keeper of the Ghosts."  A telling revision, the former title expresses the 
central character's plight as both the last living person on earth and someone who has 
suffered the loss of loved ones.  As in the epigraph to the novel, Kierkegaard's 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, "What an extraordinary change takes place. . . when 
for the first time the fact that everything depends upon how a thing is thought first enters 
the consciousness, when, in consequence, thought in its absoluteness replaces an 
apparent reality [my italics]" (Markson 6), for the protagonist, the intensely personal 
experience of grief is incommunicable; in its absoluteness, the thought that she is utterly 
alone replaces the apparent reality of intersubjectivity and becomes apparent solipsism.  
The futility that one feels in the isolation of grief, often described by the bereaved as an 
inability to connect with others, is thus given an ontological dimension.    
 As the narrator reiterates throughout the novel, she has been hearing Brahms' Alto 
Rhapsody, a Romantic opus about spiritual privation and solitude.  Near the novel's close 
she mentions: 
   Oh.  And I have been hearing the Alto Rhapsody again also, these  
  days.   
   Which is to say, the real Alto Rhapsody this time, what with all of  
  that having finally been sorted out.   
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   Even if it is hardly the real one either, naturally, still only being in  
  my head.  (Markson 240) 
Although she struggles to remember the importance of this piece, she recalls early on that 
"In SoHo, my recording of the Alto Rhapsody was an old Kathleen Ferrier recording" 
(38).  For the attentive reader, this yields a potential source for her self-identification as 
"Kate."   
 While the other names that appear in the novel, "Helen" and "Artemisia," are 
easily traced back to Helen of Troy (or Helen Frankenthaler) and Artemisia Gentileschi, 
the name "Kate" seems at first to be her "real" name because it is referred to prior to the 
mention of Kathleen Ferrier and takes the diminutive "Kate" instead of Kathleen. The 
context in which it appears, however, is a memory of her mother saying "You will never 
know how much it means to me that you are an artist, Kate" (33) and which is repeated 
near the novel's close, but with the variation "You will never know how much it means to 
me that you are an artist, Helen" (228) proceeded by an anecdote wherein the narrator 
confesses she had intended to sign her mother's mirror "Artemisia."  Amid this confusion, 
it can be seen that there is no means to definitively establish her identity if she is our only 
frame of reference.   
 Why, then, has Markson chosen Kate as the first name assumed?  Among the 
notable performances to Ferrier's credit, Gustav Mahler's Kindertotenlieder, translated as 
Songs on the Death of Children, may provide the key to one of Markson's most subtle 
allusions. If not the key, then at the very least a felicitous coincidence, for the novel can 
be said to function as the narrator's Kindertotenlieder--the loss that cannot be understood 
but in the singing of it.  Therefore, the narrator's search for precision in language, while 
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Wittgensteinian, speaks more to the artist's desire to convey a provisional truth, the truth 
of loss and the truth of the nothing, than to represent a "reality" that is always already 
constituted through our fallible perception.  As Heidegger describes in "The Origin of the 
Work of Art," "Truth happens in Van Gogh's painting.  This does not mean that 
something at hand is correctly portrayed, but rather in the revelation of the equipmental 
beings of the shoes beings as a whole. . . attain to unconcealment.  Thus in the work it is 
truth, not merely something true, that is at work" (181).   
 In a sly reference to Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art," Markson's 
narrator comments "One of the things people generally admired about Van Gogh, even 
though they were not always aware of it, was the way he could make even a chair seem to 
have anxiety in it.  Or a pair of boots" (138). Given that "Anxiety reveals the nothing" 
("What is Metaphysics?" 101), and "Without the original revelation of the nothing, no 
selfhood and no freedom" (103), the anxiety that Van Gogh depicts is none other than the 
transcendence of Dasein, for "Being held out into the nothing--as Dasein is--on the 
ground of concealed anxiety is its surpassing of beings as a whole.  It is transcendence" 
(106). 
 As such, Markson dramatizes the process by which the negation of death gives 
way to the nihilation of loss when anxiety does not have an object, in Heidegger's anxiety 
proper:  
We "hover" in anxiety.  More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because 
it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. . . Anxiety robs us of 
speech.  Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing 
crowds round, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the "is" falls silent.  
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That in the malaise of anxiety we often try to shatter the vacant stillness 
with compulsive talk only proves the presence of the nothing. ("What is 
Metaphysics?" 101) 
Here Heidegger makes an important distinction between "speech" and "talk" which is 
rooted in the concept of authenticity.  While this complex analysis of the forms of 
existential discourse is explored in further detail in Being and Time, Richard Kearney's 
Modern Movements in European Philosophy succinctly explains the main thrust of 
Heidegger's thought and suffices for the purposes of this conclusion.  Kearney writes: 
The authentic form [Heidegger] calls 'Saying' (Sagen).  This he identifies 
with our ability to remain responsible for our speech by remaining silent 
so as to listen and thus genuinely respond to the voice of Being.  The 
inauthentic form he calls 'Idle Talk' (Gerede), which he goes on to define 
as an opinioned chatter totally unmindful of, because unresponsive to, the 
claim of other Daseins. (46) 
The idle or compulsive talk that only proves the presence of the nothing and with which 
Markson's narrator fills her manuscript is, however, not wholly "unresponsive to other 
Daseins"; despite her best efforts to repress her memories, she is haunted by both her 
deceased son and her missing husband who, while potentially alive beyond the "veil of 
madness" (Markson 47) that conceals other beings from her, is inexorably lost to the 
Long Ago: 
   In fact when I finally did solve why I had been feeling depressed  
  what I  told myself was that if necessary I would simply never again allow  
  myself to put  down any such things at all. 
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   As if in a manner of speaking one were no longer able to speak one 
  solitary word of Long Ago. . . 
   Especially if even in writing about such harmless items as pets I  
  could still wind up thinking about meningitis, for instance.  Or cancer.   
  (Markson 228) 
Bearing in mind that it is her "depression" that causes her to cease typing and which leads 
to her initial thoughts about anxiety as the fundamental mood of existence, the 
compulsive talk which proves the presence of the nothing is also, paradoxically, the 
authentic Saying in its totality as the "absolutely autobiographical novel" (230), or more 
generally, as the work of art which we are reading: 
 There is a distinction to be made between this sort of depression 
and the depression I generally felt while I was still doing all of that 
looking, by the way, the latter having been much more decidedly a kind of 
anxiety. 
 Although I believe I have noted that. 
 One day I appeared to have finally stopped looking, in any event. .  
 Doubtless it would have been the same time I stopped reading out 
loud, also.  (84) 
Significantly, as the last person in the world, for the narrator to stop reading out loud is 
tantamount to her taking a vow of silence.  That hers is the authentic Saying which 
remains silent to respond to Being therefore becomes clear, as the only compulsive talk 
that occurs for her is now written in the aftermath of "the altogether unsettling experience 
of this hovering [in anxiety] where there is nothing to hold onto, [and where] pure Dasein 
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is all that is there" (Heidegger 101).  For Markson as well as Fernando Pessoa, the 
Brazilian poet with whom he shares affinities, writing after the disaster is the silent 
activity wherein we sculpt our "hopeless dreams of speaking" (The Book of Disquiet 
343). This silence, however, is also the Saying of poetry--the mute singing of the words 
that one paradoxically cannot hear, but that we read and lend an imagined sonority--such 
that a world is brought into being, and in singing, made. 
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